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Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix Family Law
ABSTRAC T. This Essay explains why we should hesitate before throwing full support behind
a civil Gideon initiative for family law, regardless of how wholeheartedly we embrace the
proposition that parental rights are as important as physical liberty. The comparable importance
of these interests does not necessarily mean that custody disputes should have the same
procedural character as criminal matters, as becomes evident upon exploring some of the social,
emotional, and structural qualities that differentiate the two contexts. Enhancing access to justice
in family law requires that we design custody dispute resolution systems that honor the
constitutionally significant interests at stake while recognizing the truly unique posture in which
separating parents litigate. To pursue civil Gideon as a stand-alone reform falls short of this
challenge; it accepts the primacy of a lawyer-centric adversary system as the preferred means for
resolving custody disputes in the face of growing evidence that this framework does more harm
than good for most domestic relations litigants.
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INTRODUCTION
As Gideon v. Wainwright' reaches its fiftieth anniversary, it continues to
serve as the model for scholars, judges, and advocates who emphasize the need
for more equitable access to counsel for civil litigants. The term "civil Gideon"
now commonly serves as a shorthand for the idea that the right to appointed
counsel for indigent criminal defendants recognized in Gideon should be
extended to civil cases involving interests of a sufficient magnitude.
Civil Gideon advocates build their case on the premise that the interests at
stake in certain types of civil cases are as compelling and as constitutionally
significant as the criminal defendant's interest in physical liberty. Child
custody matters figure especially prominently in these discussions,' and this is
readily understandable: that infringements on the parent-child relationship are
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Debra Gardner, Pursuing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and Overview, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167, 168 (20o6); Steven D. Schwinn, The Right to Counsel on Appeal:
Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv. 603, 603 n.2 (20o6) (defining civil Gideon
as "the categorical, federal constitutional right to appointed counsel at civil trial, comparable
to that same right in a criminal trial in Gideon v. Wainwright").
3. A noteworthy example is the resolution passed in 20o6 by the American Bar Association,
asserting a right to counsel in civil cases involving "shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and
child custody," with child custody defined as "proceedings where the custody of a child is
determined or the termination of parental rights is threatened." ABA Resolution on Civil
Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 507, 521-22 (2006). This resolution has
been endorsed by a number of state and local bar associations, including those of Colorado,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
Washington, Boston, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, King County (Washington),
and Los Angeles County. Clare Pastore, A Civil Right to Counsel: Closer to Reality?, 42 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1065, 1o67 n.9 (2009). For additional discussions of the importance of the
interests at stake in child custody proceedings, see Roger C. Cramton, Promise and Reality in
Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 676 (1976), which notes that " [c]ivil litigation can
result in far graver deprivations of liberty or prosperity than confinement in jail" and that
the "loss of custody of children" presents "consequences of major importance"; Debra
Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 59, 69 (2007), which notes that "the right to parent" is among the
most important interests at stake in civil litigation; Michael S. Greco, Court Access Should
Not Be Rationed, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2005, at 6, which offers child custody disputes as an example
of the sort of "serious legal problem" requiring access to counsel; and Joan Grace Ritchey,
Limits on Justice: The United States' Failure To Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation,
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 338 (2oo), which similarly asserts that the loss of child custody
involves "consequences that can far outweigh short periods of deprivation of physical
liberty." See also infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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profound invasions of liberty has been recognized again and again.' Even
where the matter is a custody dispute between two parents, rather than a
termination proceeding initiated by the state, the stakes are clearly high when
litigants are battling over the time they will be allowed to spend with their
children and the right to make significant parenting decisions concerning
education, religion, health, and the like.s
Underlying the civil Gideon movement, however, is an assumption that
because a parent's right to the care and custody of her children is as important
as a criminal defendant's right to physical liberty, both contexts should reflect
the same procedural character: full-dress adversary proceedings with robust
and technical rules, where lawyers truly are necessary to fair and effective
participation. The more we learn about custody disputes, however, the more it
appears that this isn't what family law needs. Most litigants want proceedings
that are shorter, simpler, cheaper, more personal, more collaborative, and less
adversarial. These are procedural values that are-and should probably
remain-foreign to criminal proceedings. While family law scholars and
reformers have commented on the uncomfortable fit between the adversarial
model and the special qualities of domestic-relations disputes,6 these insights
have been absent from the civil Gideon discourse.
This Essay brings together these strands, asserting that we should hesitate
before throwing full support behind a civil Gideon initiative for family law,
regardless of how wholeheartedly we embrace the proposition that parental
rights are as important as physical liberty. Civil Gideon discourse trades on the
gravitas of constitutional criminal procedure but isn't sufficiently tailored to
the unique qualities of family law.' These unique qualities challenge us to
4. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
650-52 (1972). However, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the
Supreme Court held that a parent facing the involuntary termination of parental rights did
not enjoy a categorical right to counsel similar to that of a criminal defendant; instead, due
process dictated the application of a balancing test to determine whether counsel was
required in that particular case.
5. As I will explain in Part II, I focus my attention in this Essay on private custody disputes
between parents whose relationship is dissolving, as this is the area in which there has been
much less progress in the provision of legal services for the indigent.
6. See, e.g., Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal To
Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203 (2004); Janet Weinstein, And Never
the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 79 (1997).
7. This is one way in which my challenge differs from that raised by Benjamin H. Barton,
Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010). While
Barton's opposition to civil Gideon emphasizes the failures of Gideon itself, fearing that civil
Gideon will look too much like the original, my critique emphasizes the ways in which family
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design custody dispute resolution systems that honor the constitutionally
significant interests at stake while recognizing the truly unique posture in
which separating parents litigate, which is different from both the criminal
context that gave rise to Gideon and the administrative law context from which
the Court's civil due process precedents emerged. To pursue civil Gideon as a
stand-alone reform falls short of this challenge. It accepts the primacy of a
lawyer-centric adversary system as the preferred means for resolving family law
disputes in the face of growing evidence that this framework does more harm
than good for most domestic-relations litigants. Civil Gideon responds in an
admirable and important way to the unfairness of litigating without a lawyer in
a system where lawyers are indisputably necessary. But it doesn't challenge the
necessity of lawyers or envision a world in which parents can resolve their
disputes more quickly and more collaboratively than in lawyer-centered
systems.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I demonstrate that the logic of
the civil Gideon movement rests on the relatively unproblematic premise that
the interests at stake in certain civil proceedings are as constitutionally
profound and practically significant as the right to physical liberty. I further
demonstrate, however, that in urging the necessity of appointed counsel, civil
Gideon advocates assume the existence of highly formalized adversarial
proceedings in which technical legal expertise is necessary. In Part II, I explain
why this model is wrong for most family law cases. In Part III, I explore ways
in which civil Gideon might fit into systemic family court reform. I argue that
the quest for fairness and equality that animates the civil Gideon movement can
be realized in a family court system that emphasizes simplicity, efficiency, and
collaboration over formal adversarial procedure.
1. THE LOGIC OF CIVIL GIDEON
The central rhetorical strategy of civil Gideon advocates is to assert that
people enmeshed in civil litigation, especially regarding "basic human needs,"
are battling over interests that are just as compelling as the physical liberty that
is at stake for criminal defendants.
Consider the following statement:
law is fundamentally different from criminal proceedings, and thus requires an entirely
different model of access to justice.
8. See, e.g., Steven D. Schwinn, Faces of Open Courts and the Civil Right to Counsel, 37 U. BALT.
L. REV. 21, 24 (2007) (observing that, in pursuing a civil Gideon strategy, "[1]itigants must
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It is still "shocking" to our sense of justice that we would incarcerate a
criminal who was tried and convicted without an attorney. But is there
not yet another truth that must be acknowledged and addressed? Is it
not just as shocking that we leave our poor and our most vulnerable to
represent themselves in their battles for basic human needs: shelter,
sustenance, safety, and health? Whether forced out of the home,
terrified by an abuser, or denied government benefits without adequate
representation, the poor are confined. The poor are denied due process.
The poor do, indeed, suffer a loss of liberty. And in some cases, indeed
in many cases, their loss is just as great if not greater had they been
convicted of a crime and imprisoned.'
Or these two, which focus on the importance of child custody battles:
It seems to me incontestable that the threatened loss of a child is an
incomparably greater life shattering event than thirty days for
shoplifting.o
The loss of custody of one's child is a life-shattering event more
profound than the prospect of thirty days in jail. The homelessness that
may result from eviction could have consequences far more devastating
for an entire family than a short jail term for one family member.n
All of these statements reflect the premise that certain civil interests are as
profound as the physical liberty interest that is at stake in criminal proceedings.
Especially with respect to a parent's interest in custody of her children, these
assertions are persuasive." While the Supreme Court's refusal to endorse this
proposition in full is a constant source of frustration for scholars and
9. Kathryn Grant Madigan, Advocating for a Civil Right to Counsel in New York State, 25 TOuRo
L. REv. 9, 14 (2009) (footnote omitted); see also Laura K. Abel, Toward a Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases in New York State: A Report of the New York State Bar Association, 25 TouRO L.
REV. 31, 33 (2009) (noting that many "unmet legal needs concern issues of the utmost
importance to people's lives, including housing, child custody, food, shelter, employment,
and health"); Wade Henderson, Keynote Address: The Evolution and Importance of Creating a
Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TouRo L. REv. 71, 77 (2009) (noting that people are unable to
afford counsel for problems affecting "many of the most basic necessities of life and the
most fundamental elements of people's lives").
1o. Stephen H. Sachs, Seeking a Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases in Maryland, 37 U.
BALT. L. REv. 5, 14 (2007).
i1. Gardner, supra note 3, at 73 (footnote omitted).
12. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 7, at 1241 ("Outside of imprisonment, the right to parent one's
children is perhaps the strongest constitutional liberty interest.").
2111
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
advocates," even the Court's own case law provides ample support for the
notion that this is one of the most venerated liberty interests recognized in
constitutional law. 4
The problem that I want to illuminate is the assumption that the
procedural values that accompany civil proceedings should therefore be the
same: full-dress, judge- and lawyer-centered adversary proceedings with the
kind of intricate and technical rules that necessitate legal expertise. Much of the
civil Gideon discourse reflects such an assumption. Gideon itself, of course, was
predicated on the Court's observation that "in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.""s Civil Gideon advocates
assert that "Gideon's recognition that the lack of counsel distorts the adversary
process is no less true in the civil context, at least in cases that implicate
fundamental rights or basic human needs."" The conclusion that lawyers are
necessary to vindicate basic fairness concerns in civil litigation is often
predicated upon the nature of adversarial process.17 One civil Gideon advocate,
for example, summarizes research showing that parties with lawyers are far
more likely to file motions, request discovery, and receive continuances,
thereby using the "procedural mechanisms that are key to success in civil
litigation. ,, This result is hardly surprising, but it should inspire some inquiry
into whether more motions, discovery, and continuances are in fact what most
family law litigants need, a question I take up in the next Part.
First, I want to explore in more depth the fact that civil Gideon advocates
assume - maybe even endorse -the existence of highly formalized adversarial
proceedings in the cases involving the most pressing human concerns. This
expectation is .traceable to the Mathews v. Eldridge test the Supreme Court
applies in civil due process cases, which examines the private interest at stake,
13. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to
Counsel Afier Lassiter v. North Carolina, i5 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981) ("Lassiter, for all
practical purposes, stands for the proposition that a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a
greater deprivation of liberty than a parent's permanent loss of rights in a child.").
14. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000).
15. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
16. Gardner, supra note 3, at 72-73.
17. See, e.g., Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 15o8 (2004) ("The correct functioning of the adversarial process
itself relies on the assumption that both sides are coming to the process with equal legal
resources."); Sachs, supra note lo, at 16 (emphasizing the role of lawyers in "mak[ing] the
adversary system work").
18. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 71.
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the risk of erroneous deprivation and the extent to which additional procedures
might reduce that risk, and the government's interest in adhering to its chosen
set of procedures. 9 This creates an explicit correlation between the seriousness
of the private interest involved and the likelihood that a particular procedure is
constitutionally required. While the refrain that due process is a "flexible"
concept has become quite familiar,2 o this is generally taken to mean that the
intricacy and formality of the procedures required rise and fall with the weight
of the interests at stake."
While the Mathews v. Eldridge test instructs that the private interest be
weighed against two other factors, we nonetheless intuitively expect
adjudicative procedures to become more elaborate as the interests at stake
become more profound." The Supreme Court has contributed to this dynamic
ig. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
20. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 36 (1976) (noting that the "Court had
often emphasized the flexibility of its approach to due process and the necessity of
evaluating each claim virtually on its own facts"); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C.
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455,
456 (1986) ("The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to its long-standing position that
the content of due process is extremely flexible, and not susceptible to precise definition.").
21. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 20, at 471 ("Once the Court's balance became explicit,
litigants began to stress the importance of their substantive interests, while the government
urged the innocuousness of its deprivations.").
22. I think this explains some of the criticism of cases like Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18 (1981), and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton
& Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to justice, 16o U.
PA. L. REv. 967, 970 & n.16 (2012) (characterizing the response to Turner's right-to-counsel
holding as largely condemnatory); Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right
to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge ofLassiter v. Department of Social
Services of Durham, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 363 (2005). In Lassiter, the Supreme Court rejected
a claim that appointed counsel was constitutionally required in parental termination
proceedings; in Turner, it arrived at the same result with respect to a child-support
contempt proceeding initiated by an unrepresented custodial parent even though the obligor
was subject to civil imprisonment for his failure to pay. In both cases, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the strength of the private interests at stake-parental rights and physical
liberty, respectively -and then took pains to explain why the government had strong
countervailing interests and why additional procedures would not materially affect the risk
of erroneous deprivation. If one accepts the majority's factual premises (which are not
unassailable, it must be noted), these cases could be justified as facially reasonable
applications of the Mathews test, which explicitly engages three distinct factors rather than
treating the private interest as dispositive. Nonetheless, given the gravity of the private
interests involved, the results of Lassiter and Turner are jarring: they reveal the startling
strength of the other two factors and run counter to our intuition that the weight of the
private interest should drive the due process calculus.
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with its treatment of criminal matters in which physical liberty is threatened;
these serve as the gold standard for proceedings in which the intricacy and
formality of the governing procedures reflect the seriousness of the interests at
stake."
To accept a departure from the procedures that characterize the criminal
model is thus understandably seen as an inescapable departure downward, as an
acknowledgement that the rights at stake in less elaborate proceedings have an
inferior status. In the world of due process, it is an article of faith that more
process is better-if not from the standpoint of overall social utility, then at
least from the perspective of the individual whose interests are at issue. For all
the differences among them, due process cases invariably come to the Court
with the individual on the cusp of losing a vital interest asserting that a
particular procedure is constitutionally necessary." Against this backdrop, it is
unsurprising that our jurisprudential culture assumes that procedure is
protective, such that the individual in question would naturally want more of
it. To support additional procedural intricacy is to stand on the side of
individual rights.
Within this framework, custody cases would be obvious candidates for
adversarial proceedings that necessitate the technical expertise of a lawyer
because, as everyone generally recognizes, the private interest at stake is among
the weightiest. But as I will detail in the next Part, the bulk of family law cases
challenge the idea that more procedure is always better for individual litigants.
II. WHY THIS MODEL IS WRONG FOR FAMILY LAW
To see why this is so, we have to first divide custody cases into three
categories: custody disputes between parents whose relationship is dissolving;
state-initiated proceedings in which the state is seeking to obtain custody of an
23. See, e.g., Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25 (noting that "an indigent's right to appointed counsel ... has
been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation" and emphasizing that "it is the defendant's interest in personal freedom" that
drives that result); see also id. at 42 & n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (charging the majority
with "emphasizing the value of physical liberty to the exclusion of all other fundamental
interests" and "opting for the insensitive presumption that incarceration is the only loss of
liberty sufficiently onerous to justify a right to appointed counsel"). Interestingly, Gideon
itself didn't rely on an analysis of the seriousness of the interest at stake, but rather stressed
fundamental fairness. As retrofitted by Lassiter, however, the procedural protections
associated with criminal trials are justified by the potential loss of the most constitutionally
significant liberty interest.
24. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Gideon, Mathews, Lassiter, and Turner also fit this description.
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abused or neglected child or to terminate parental rights altogether; and
disputes between a parent and a third party who, for whatever reason, asserts
some sort of custodial right to the child in question. I am focused here on the
first category, because these cases are far and away the most numerous, and
because most states provide a right to counsel for cases in the second
category.2 s The third category is admittedly problematic, in that parents are
often defending against allegations that they are unfit to regain custody of
children they have voluntarily and informally placed in the temporary care of
others." For purposes of this Essay, I will assume that cases in this category
should be treated like cases in the second, with equivalent rights to appointed
counsel. But that still leaves us with the lion's share of cases in which custody
of a child is at issue: private custody disputes between two people both
recognized as the child's parent. This is a singular posture in law for which
comparisons to criminal prosecutions are simply inapt. The procedural model
that characterizes criminal prosecutions transfers poorly to family law, as I will
elaborate in this Part.
At first blush, the social, emotional, and structural differences between
custody disputes and criminal prosecutions seem too intuitive to warrant much
discussion. But it is worth exploring some of these differences so that we can
critically assess the assumption that the procedures used to resolve these
respective matters should be similar. First, the litigants on either side of a
private custody dispute are similarly situated with regards to the interests at
stake: they are each legally recognized as parents, with all the rights and
responsibilities that recognition entails, and each one stands to lose time with
his or her children and authority over their upbringing. 7 But they aren't losing
these precious rights to the state, or to a third party; neither parent in a private
custody dispute occupies the sort of defensive posture that can be analogized to
that of a criminal defendant. In private custody disputes it is more apt to say
that the parenting time and authority the two parents used to enjoy as an
undifferentiated whole,8 must now be parceled out between them. The
litigants are engaged in the dissolution of an intact family unit that is presumed
25. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 245-46 (2006); Boyer, supra note 22, at 367-68.
26. See, e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 84o A.2d 114, 115 (Md. 2003).
27. The custody hearing itself may reveal that one parent is in fact the primary caretaker, for
whom the loss of custody would be more emotionally devastating. But at the threshold of
the proceeding, neither parent enjoys a legal posture that is superior to the other.
28. The concept of an undifferentiated whole represents the state's perspective vis-4-vis intact
families; it does not, of course, capture the day-to-day parenting realities of any particular
family.
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to operate in the best interests of its constituent members and thus assumed to
function best with minimal interference. The role of the custody hearing is to
move the family from a privately determined allocation of rights and
responsibilities to a state-mandated allocation of rights and responsibilities.
It is difficult to overstate how different this is from a criminal proceeding,
in which the defendant is fighting against the state for his freedom, the state is
fighting to exercise its authority to punish, and the two litigants represent the
opposite poles of power, authority, and institutional strength.2 9 The more we
dwell on the comparison, the more it seems odd to expect that the adversarial
model that characterizes criminal proceedings, with cross-examination, rules of
evidence, jury instructions, and the lawyers necessary to navigate these
technically difficult waters, would be appropriate for the allocation of rights
and responsibilities between a child's two parents.
If all this seems at once rather obvious and a bit abstract, consider that the
majority of private custody disputes will result in orders that require extensive
cooperation between the parties, whether they pertain to day-to-day logistics of
transporting children from one parent's household to the other or to joint
parental decisionmaking about education or medical treatment.30 And even
where this is not the case -for example, in those cases where one parent will be
the primary residential custodian and will be awarded exclusive
decisionmaking authority- children benefit from a process that arrives at this
result smoothly and expeditiously." In custody disputes there is thus an
enormous premium on resolving the matter swiftly and with minimal amounts
of acrimony and hostility-both to reduce a child's exposure to these toxic
displays and to preserve the conditions necessary for successful postdivorce
parenting. If we accept only this fairly intuitive premise, the adversarial model
immediately loses ground as an appropriate mechanism for resolving most
private custody disputes.
This is repeatedly confirmed by a growing body of research, much of it
conducted by legislative and judicial officials tasked with reforming their states'
29. See Nancy Leong, Gideon's Law-Protective Function, 122 YALE L.J. 2460,2476-78(2013).
30. Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm Shift,
47 FAM. CT. REv. 363, 365 (2009) (noting a "commitment to shared parenting" that "is
reflected not only in the increasingly common statutory preference for postdivorce custody
arrangements that facilitate close and continuing contact with both parents, but also in the
parenting arrangements actually produced").
31. See, e.g., id. at 363 ("[S]ocial science suggests that children's adjustment to divorce and
separation depends significantly on their parents' behavior during and after the separation
process: the higher the levels of parental conflict to which children are exposed, the more
negative the effects of family dissolution.").
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family court systems." A discussion paper prepared by a Colorado judicial
committee argues that the traditional adversarial process "may cause
irreparable damage to family relationships, which are necessarily linked for
many years in the future."" Among the four overarching principles proposed
by the committee to guide family court reform was "timely, efficient and less
adversarial processes."
This body of research reveals that the individuals whom the system is
designed to serve repeatedly express dissatisfaction with an adversarial
approach to divorce and custody cases. As summed up by one state's task force
on family court reform, it appears that "[t]he public is disgusted with the
adversarial model of managing divorce."" Another report posits that "the
public dissatisfaction with judicial management of family matters probably
relates in part to the fact that we are using a tool - the adversarial system - that
was neither designed nor intended for dealing with sensitive family
relations.",,
In one survey of parents represented by counsel, seventy-one percent felt
that the legal process exacerbated feelings of anger and hostility that existed at
the outset." What is particularly interesting for our purposes is that attorney
representation was directly implicated in this intensification. The researchers
found that
[t]he role of the attorneys was perceived as contributing to parental
rivalry and conflict by creating and encouraging less communication
between parents. . .. Parents expressed, "It is hard to co-parent when
32. For a history of research and reform efforts in one state, see Pamela A. Gagel, Inst. for the
Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Changing Cultures, Changing Rules: A Colorado Case
Study (Jan. 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
3. Court Improvement Comm., Colorado Courts' Recommendations for Family Cases: An Analysis
and Recommendation for Cases Involving Families, COLO. JUD. BRANCH 12 (May zoo),
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/CourtProbation/SupremeCourt/Committees
/StandingCommittee onFamily-Issues/recommendations 1.pdf.
34. Id. at 2.
35. OR. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAw, FINAL REPORT TO GOvERNOR JOHN A. KITZHABER AND THE
OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 5 (1997).
36. Stephen J. Harhai, Families and Courts: A Roadmap to a More Effective Partnership 3 (July
15, 1994) (unpublished report) (on file with author). This is the report of the proceedings of
the Family Law University, a conference held in May and June 1994 that included over 140
individuals concerned with the direction of family law in Colorado.
37. Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer's Role During the Divorce Process:
Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children, and Their Attorneys, 33 FAM. L.Q. 283, 298
(1999).
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you are not speaking to each other," and are "going through attorneys
only." Even parents who felt that their spouses were generally
acceptable people iterated that he or she became a "monster" during the
legal conflict. Their relationships became more normalized when the
parents felt they took more of the process into their own hands and out
of the lawyers'.3
What is perhaps most remarkable is that for some litigants with the
resources to choose, lawyers in private custody disputes are neither luxuries
nor necessities39 but rather liabilities. In one study of unrepresented divorce
litigants, more than twenty percent said they could afford a lawyer.4o Similarly,
after the state of Oregon held public hearings on the divorce system, the task
force reported that "[m]any pro se litigants can afford lawyers" but do not
engage their services because "[t]hey fear getting sucked into a vortex of
conflict.""' Numerous words of caution are in order. First, this observation
obviously lacks the precision that would allow us to arrive at rigorous
conclusions regarding the number of pro se litigants who proceed without
counsel by choice. Second, the fact that many pro se litigants voluntarily forego
the assistance of counsel does nothing, of course, to ameliorate the plight of
those litigants who want the assistance of counsel but cannot afford it."2 Lastly,
we can quarrel with the assumption that lawyers necessarily create and
intensify conflict -certainly, we can and should envision a world in which the
counseling, negotiating, and drafting skills deployed by talented family law
specialists could reduce rather than exacerbate conflict. But this finding does
something interesting nonetheless: it reveals the concern that whatever lawyers
bring to the table in divorce disputes, it is the wrong thing -the very thing
families are seeking to avoid.
Why might this be? Why would the assistance of counsel be seen as a
hindrance, a route to more conflict and less cooperation? The answer may lie in
the ways in which "thinking like a lawyer" is divergent from "thinking like a
38. Id.
39. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (asserting that "lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries").
40. Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 28 FAM. L.Q4o7, 411 (1994).
41. Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified Family Court: A
Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q 95, 103 (1998) (citing OR. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
LAw, A STATUS REPORT 6-7 (1996)).
42. This is made even more obvious by reference to the criminal context, where it would be
outlandish to suggest that the fact that some criminal defendants choose to waive counsel
somehow calls into question the imperative to provide counsel for those indigent defendants
who do want to be represented.
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parent." Even a rudimentary exploration of what it might mean to think like a
lawyer is well beyond the scope of this Essay, and it is even more foolish to
suggest that there is any sort of consensus regarding what it means to be or
think like a parent. Nonetheless, consider the definitions offered by Dr. Robert
Emery, a clinical psychologist and director of the Center for Children, Families,
and the Law at the University of Virginia, who suggests that thinking "like a
parent" rather than like a lawyer means "taking the long view" and pursuing
arrangements that parents "truly think will be best for their children"
regardless of what they might be entitled to under the governing legal
standard.4 1 Using this definition, we can readily see how even minimum
standards of professional competence can operate in tension with thinking like
a parent. Emery describes a scenario in which the divorcing parents of a three-
month-old infant might both be amenable to an arrangement in which the
child initially resides solely with his nursing mother.' The father will have
regular daytime contact with the baby, with the understanding that overnight
visits will begin once the child reaches twelve to eighteen months of age, and
will increase gradually from there toward equally shared parenting time once
the child reaches school age. The proposal has much to recommend it: aside
from the significant virtue that the parents agree, it also keeps both parents
meaningfully involved while avoiding the concerns that attend moving very
young children back and forth from one home to another. Yet, as Emery notes,
"good lawyers will raise cautions (as they should under current laws)."" The
partisan advocacy that characterizes the assistance of counsel in an adversarial
system can create a coordination problem, preventing parents from realizing
the mutual gains of a cooperative approach to resolving custody disputes.46
43. ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND
MEDIATION 121-22 (2d ed. 2012).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 122. Emery explains that the mother's lawyer should advise her that, as a nursing
mother, she could very well obtain sole physical custody without any commitment to
increase the father's time with the child as the child grows older. The father's lawyer would
be obliged to inform his client about the difficulties in enforcing the provisions regarding
future increases in parenting time.
46. See Harhai, supra note 36, at 3 ("In the traditional adversarial system the attorneys manage
the case. Each pursues the objectives of the client and uses all available means to do so. If the
parties never want to see each other after it's over, so be it. An excellent attorney may
recognize that the larger objectives of the client may be served by reducing the conflict and
preserving the relationship, but the system itself does little to support such an approach. In
family litigation an attorney who works hard to reduce conflict may be perceived as 'soft' by
the client and urged to take a more aggressive stand, or replaced. An attorney-client team
that does choose the conciliatory approach is generally at the mercy of a vicious opponent
because the system neither rewards the peacemaker nor punishes the warmonger."). For an
2119
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
This is a painfully glancing treatment of the fact that the adversarial model
fits poorly with most pressing goals of family court, but the truth is that this
disconnect is not news to scholars and reformers who study private custody
disputes." In fact, as others have noted, some family courts have already been
experiencing a "paradigm shift" away from a "law-oriented and judge-focused
adversary model" toward "a more collaborative, interdisciplinary, and forward-
looking family dispute resolution regime."48 The question is how the paradigm
shift taking place in divorce and custody resolution interacts with the fairness
concerns that animate the civil Gideon movement, directing it toward an
agenda of equal access to counsel regardless of wealth. In the next Part, I
briefly sketch how these two strands might be woven together. In doing so, I
draw on a rich existing literature of family court innovation, without
attempting to do it justice or purporting to offer a comprehensive vision for
reform. Instead, I highlight a few principles that have the potential to unite the
goals of equalizing access to justice with the movement toward simpler and
more collaborative custody proceedings.
III. FITTING CIVIL GIDEON INTO SYSTEMIC FAMILY LAW REFORM
As scholars and lawmakers have recognized, one of the most important
attributes of an improved family court system is the capacity to treat different
types of cases differently.49 Not all custody cases are amenable to swift,
interview-based empirical account of the efforts of practicing family law attorneys to grapple
with the tension between vigorous advocacy and the long-term interests of their clients, see
LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. McEWEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK:
VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 18-36, 110-32 (2001). See also AUSTIN SARAT &
WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DivoRcE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN
THE LEGAL PROCEss 53-58 (1995) (examining the efforts of divorce lawyers to shape their
clients' expectations about reasonable demands and realistic outcomes).
47. See supra note 6.
48. Singer, supra note 30, at 363 (noting that a primary component of the paradigm shift is "a
profound skepticism about the value of traditional adversary procedures" and that "[a] n
overriding theme of recent divorce reform efforts is that adversary processes are ill suited for
resolving disputes involving children").
49. See generally Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From
Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Diferential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 395, 397 (2000) (describing the need to "triage" high-conflict cases "early in their
judicial life cycle without burdening the great percentage of reasonably cooperative
divorcing parents with unduly intrusive state intervention"); Elkins Family Law Task Force,
Final Report and Recommendations, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. 20 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/elkins-finalreport.pdf (criticizing the uniform
treatment of family law cases that present very different concerns).
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cooperative resolution,so however much this might be desirable and achievable
for most families.s' In certain cases-those involving, for example, allegations
of partner violence, child abuse, or substantial imbalance in economic power-
it would be procedurally unjust to subject the parties to a process that is swift,
supposedly collaborative, and outside the orbit of close judicial supervision.
For these cases, an adversarial posture is appropriate, and the assistance of a
partisan advocate is necessary.s3 That is why a critical reform element for family
court is a triage system, sometimes described as differentiated case
management, which distinguishes between those cases that require litigation
and those that do not, and does so early enough in the process to recognize the
gains that come from such a sorting.s4 Offering various procedural tracks that
are tailored to the complexity and level of conflict in a particular case is a
reform that should come before the categorical provision of lawyers to all
individuals engaged in a custody dispute -not only because it is, arguably, a
higher priority, but also because such differentiation has the potential to
delineate more meaningfully what lawyers in different types of custody cases
should be doing.
It is easy enough to envision the role of lawyers for cases that will be
litigated-they will be deploying the "procedural mechanisms that are key to
so. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of
the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1987, 2035 (1999) (observing that
mediation involving unrepresented parties may be inappropriate where significant power
imbalances exist),
si. By one estimate, between ten and fifteen percent of divorces "can be characterized as high
conflict." Jo-Anne M. Stoltz & Tara Ney, Resistance to Visitation: Rethinking Parental and
Child Alienation, 40 FAm. CT. REv. 220 (2002).
S2. See, for example, the facts of King v. King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. 2007). During the marriage,
the husband worked outside the home while the wife was the primary caretaker of the
couple's three children. Nonetheless, when the husband petitioned for dissolution, he
sought to become the primary residential custodian. He was represented by private counsel
at the custody trial, while the wife, who had not completed high school, proceeded pro se
after numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain pro bono or court-appointed counsel.
53. See Russell Engler, Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines: When Does Access
to justice Mean Full Representation by Counsel, and When Might Less Assistance Suffice?, 9
SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 97, 121-22 (2011) (urging that power dynamics between the parties be
used as a factor for assessing when the assistance of counsel is necessary).
s4. The idea is rooted in Maurice Rosenberg's concept of the "multidoor courthouse," which
"fits the forum to the fuss." Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to
the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, NEGOTIATION J., Jan. 1994, at
49, 67.
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success in civil litigation"s -but what about the others? What is the role of
lawyers in the eighty-five to ninety percent of cases that are not characterized
by excessive conflict and that can and should be resolved by simple, cheap, and
cooperative procedures? For these cases - again, the lion's share - lawyers have
an important role to play, but one that is potentially very different from the
partisan advocacy that prevails in the adversarial model and that continues to
characterize the civil Gideon discourse.
Lawyers in these cases are necessary to provide guidance and advice-
counseling the separating parents on the governing legal frameworks, eliciting
the parents' respective goals and positions, and explaining how the court is
likely to rule in the absence of parental agreement. Lawyers are needed to draft
comprehensive and finely crafted agreements that anticipate and minimize the
issues that can wreak havoc after the decree has been issued. Moreover, lawyers
must work alongside therapists, financial advisors, parent educators, and other
professionals who can help the family with a successful transition to
postdivorce parenting. Those who support a civil Gideon initiative for family
law must grapple with the possibility that, in a number of these cases, one
lawyer might suffice -a lawyer who can serve the couple's mutual interests in a
swift, cheap, collaborative dissolution.s6 Civil Gideon advocates who have
grown accustomed to invoking the notion of equally armed adversaries must
recognize that in these cases, the parties are better conceived of as joint clients.
This concept has some significant challenges, to be sure. Most importantly,
it requires sensitive, sophisticated, and individualized mechanisms for
obtaining informed consent; lawyers must then be highly attuned to the
possible emergence of conflicts of interest that might require withdrawal." But
for all its difficulties, the idea should be on the table, not only to reduce the cost
5s. See supra note s8 and accompanying text; see also King, 174 P. 3d at 674-76 (Madsen, J.,
dissenting) (describing in detail a pro se litigant's struggle to navigate a custody trial,
including her inability to differentiate between offering testimony, examining witnesses,
and making arguments to the court).
56. Engaging one lawyer to advance the limited set of joint interests shared by a divorcing
couple is one form of limited-scope representation contemplated in Rule 1.2(c) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Where reasonable and with the client's informed consent,
the rule permits a form of practice that has come to be known as unbundled legal services, in
which lawyers "offer clients a menu of services instead of the traditional full service
package." Statewide Family Law Advisory Comm., Or. Judicial Dep't, Oregon's Integrated
Family Court ofthe Future, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 474, 484 (2002). For more on the importance of
unbundling to family law litigants, see Special Issue, Unbundled Legal Services and
Unrepresented Family Court Litigants, 4o FAM. CT. REv. S (2002).
57. In future work, I will explore in detail the ethical challenges that attend such a model and
evaluate whether they can be overcome in some meaningful subset of cases.
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of divorce and custody disputes -thus making a civil Gideon initiative more
realistic-but also to offer access to legal advice in a posture that steers clear of
the adversarial paradigm that so many families wish to avoid. Providing this
kind of representation to those who cannot pay for it advances a concept of
fairness that exists independently of the adversarial paradigm and in fact is
much more expansive. It recognizes that clients engage with the legal system
not merely as atomistic individuals battling against adversaries, but as
members of a family unit who, even in dissolution, share common goals. It
contemplates access to legal expertise as a mechanism for preventing and
reducing family conflict, rather than assuming that custody battles must entail
the vigorous procedural maneuvers that only lawyers can provide.
CONCLUSION
Civil Gideon advocates are at their most persuasive when emphasizing the
profound importance of the interests at stake in certain areas of civil litigation.
For many civil Gideon advocates, a particularly enduring frustration is the
Supreme Court's inability to recognize the importance of parental rights as
compared to a loss of physical liberty. On this point, I offer no dispute and
think that none is warranted.
But a full assessment of civil Gideon proposals requires more than just
evaluating the strength of the interests at stake; it requires sensitivity to the
nature of the proceedings. The fact that custody of one's children is as
important as anything else we can imagine does not mean that a dispute
between two parents is equivalent or even analogous to criminal proceedings -
or that it should be. In fact, the research summarized above suggests that
significant numbers of family court litigants would prefer a system that looked
much less like the traditional adversary process than it currently does. That is
why simply reasoning analogically from physical liberty to parental rights does
not tell us whether the procedural values associated with criminal proceedings
should transfer to private custody disputes. As I have attempted to outline in
this Essay, there are reasons to think that private custody proceedings should
be designed according to different procedural values: simplicity, efficiency,
collaboration, and avoidance of adversarial conflict. A system that honors the
preferences of most of its litigants for these values can be consistent with the
demands of due process.
That is not to say that there is no role for lawyers in a family court system
reformed with these values in mind. On the contrary, these reforms will lead us
to a productive vantage point from which to introduce more lawyers into the
system-as counselors, negotiators, and drafters for most parties, or litigators
in the few cases for which that is appropriate. And these services should
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certainly be accessible to all, regardless of ability to pay. But until we redesign
the family court system to better serve the families who need its help, simply
adding lawyers won't fix it.
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